Uncertainty in election outcomes generates politically induced regulatory risk. For monopoly regulation, political parties' risk attitudes towards such risk depend on a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at least one party. Irrespective of the parties' risk attitudes, political parties have incentives to negotiate away regulatory risk by pre-electoral bargaining. Pareto-efficient bargaining outcomes fully eliminate regulatory risk and are attainable through institutionalizing independent regulatory agencies with a specific objective. Key aspects of the regulatory overhaul of the US Postal system in 1970 are argued to be consistent with these results.
Introduction
Given that regulation has become a pervasive feature of most markets, uncertainty about changes in regulatory environments is a major operating concern for firms. Indeed surveys on business risks (e.g. EUI 2005 , Ernst&Young 2008 , 2010 , Allianz 2015 consistently rank this uncertainty as one of the main risks for businesses. Highlighting the active role that political institutions have in managing regulatory risk, Ernst&Young (2010, p.10) emphasizes that "governments need to move fast to remove uncertainty".
Consequently, this paper studies the question whether political parties have both an inherent incentive and the means to reduce regulatory risk, or whether modern political systems exhibit some perverse incentive that prevents them for doing so or even encourages them to artificially impose regulatory risk. The paper formally shows that, for monopoly regulation, political parties have indeed incentives to remove politically induced regulatory risk through political bargaining. It, moreover, argues that they can eliminate such risk by institutionalizing independent regulatory agencies. The paper therefore offers a new explanation for the prevalence of such agencies: their ability to limit regulatory risk. As discussed in Section 8, this empirical implication matches well the shaping of, for instance, the US Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) as an independent regulatory agency.
Theoretical results are obtained in the regulation framework of Baron and Myerson (1982) , where a benevolent government regulates a privately informed monopolist with the objective to maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus and profits. I embed this framework in a political economy setup, where two political parties differ in their views about the appropriate weight on profits. These different political views cause a preference for different regulated output schedules. Hence, when election outcomes are random, the firm's output is random and this signifies the regulatory risk.
In order to evaluate the parties' risk attitudes towards this risk, I compare their expected payoffs with and without regulatory risk. This comparison reveals that regulatory risk affects political parties through two effects: a fluctuation and an output-expansion effect. These two effects follow directly from the fact that under regulatory risk the firm's output is random.
Intuitively, the fluctuation effect represents the variance of this randomness, while the outputexpansion effect is linked to the output's mean under the randomness.
Because consumers have a decreasing marginal utility in consumption, they dislike any variance in the firm's output so that the fluctuation effect affects consumer surplus adversely.
Hence, the fluctuation effect also hurts political parties that put positive weight on consumer surplus.
In contrast, a party's attitude towards the output expansion effect is more subtle. The expansion effect expresses whether the firm's regulated output is, in expectation, larger or smaller than in the absence of the randomness. Depending on the convexity of the consumer's demand function, the output expansion effect can be positive or negative. If the expansion is positive, then it benefits the party that puts more weights on profits, while it hurts the other party. If the expansion effect is negative, these effects are reversed. Hence, exactly one party likes the expansion effect, while the other party dislikes it.
Taking both the fluctuation and expansion effect into consideration, it follows that at least one party unambiguously dislikes regulatory risk, whilst the other party dislikes regulatory risk only when the fluctuation effect outweighs the expansion effect. As I show this is the case when the party's winning probability is large or the overall degree of political divergence is small.
In order to study the link between regulatory risk and the independence of regulatory agencies, I next consider the parties' incentive to delegate the regulatory task to a regulatory agency. In particular, I allow parties to bargain about the agency's appropriate objective before the election, but with the outside option that if the pre-electoral bargaining breaks down, the party who wins the election chooses the agency's objective. I obtain that, regardless of the parties' attitudes towards regulatory risk, any Pareto efficient bargaining outcome eliminates all regulatory risk. Efficient bargaining therefore induces parties to institutionalize an independent regulatory agency whose objective is independent of the election outcome. This eliminates all regulatory risk and establishes the main insight of this paper: Benevolent political parties, who differ in the relative emphasis they put on consumer surplus versus profits, have a natural incentive to reduce rather than increase regulatory risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature. Section 3 sets up the framework and characterizes the comparative statics of the optimal regulation contract. Section 4 shows that electoral uncertainty without political bargaining induces regulatory risk. Section 5 analyzes the attitudes of political parties towards this risk, while Section 6 studies their incentives in eliminating it through political bargaining. Introducing political competition, Section 7 considers endogenous election outcomes. Section 8 illustrates that the theoretical insights help to understand how independent regulatory agencies are shaped in practise by discussing regulation of the US postal system. The paper closes with a discussion about the paper's theoretical results in Section 9. For those propositions that do not follow directly from the text, formal proofs are collected in the appendix.
Related Literature
The paper's focus on the effect of electoral uncertainty on optimal regulation relates it to the literature on the political economy of regulation. In particular, Baron (1988) studies how the political framework affects regulatory outcomes. Because there is no electoral uncertainty, Baron (1988) does however not exhibit regulatory risk. Introducing electoral uncertainty explicitly, Laffont (1996) , Boyer and Laffont (1999) , and also Laffont (2000) point out that politically controlled regulation leads to regulation outcomes that fluctuate with the uncertain election outcome. These fluctuations imply regulatory risk. The studies point out that fluctuations are excessive from an overall welfare perspective and, subsequently, study the welfare effects of reducing fluctuations by limiting the discretionary power of political parties. In contrast to this welfare orientated approach, the current paper provides a more positive analysis and shows that the political parties themselves have already incentives and ways to limit these fluctuations.
Because this former literature abstracts from this possibility, this paper's results suggest that the negative welfare effects of fluctuations are less severe than these earlier studies indicate.
More generally, this paper is an illustration of the general insight in political science that, due to political uncertainty, politicians may benefit from smoothening fluctuations in political decision making. This smoothing motive is, next to the insulation motive, one of the main rationales for delegating political decisions to independent bureaucracies.
1 In particular, Fiorina (1982) provides an explicit analysis of the smoothing motive, demonstrating that the risk preferences of political actors is its main driver. He thereby implicitly criticizes that the smoothing motive "takes us willy-nilly into the realm of functional forms (Fiorina p.57, 1982) ".
By explicitly modeling the regulatory problem that underlies the political decision, this paper addresses this criticism by providing a micro foundation of these functional forms.
2 An additional advantage of the micro foundation is that it yields new and more concrete insights in the potential benefits of the smoothing motive -the fluctuation and the output-expansion effect, which can then be related directly to economic fundamentals such as the underlying demand conditions.
In contrast, the insulation motive expresses the incentive of an incumbent political party to insulate its policies against changes by opponents that come to power in the future. For example, Moe (1990, p.229) argues that political uncertainty induces current public authority holders to use delegation as "protective devices for insulating agencies from political enemies".
In this vein, Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003) show in an economic environment how an incumbent government benefits from politically independent agencies in order to insulate its 1 Protection against dynamic inconsistent behavior (e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rogoff 1985) provides a further strategic rationale for delegating power to independent bureaucracies, but is also not linked to political uncertainty or fluctuations in political control. 2 See also de Figueiredo (2002) , who investigates a model with political uncertainty where the parties' payoff functions are, by assumption, single-peaked and concave, implying risk averse behavior with respect to the one-dimensional policy variable.
policies against changes by differently minded politicians in the future. Although also the insulation motive favors commitment through delegation, this motive is not directly related to electorial uncertainty or regulatory risk. To see this, note that the insulation motive is strongest if the governing party is certain to lose the next election -i.e., when there is no risk; and the motive is weakened if there is electoral uncertainty so that the change is less certain. Hence, the insulation motive is related to electoral change rather than electoral risk. While both the insulation motive and regulatory risk are two possible drivers of delegation, the regulatory risk motive yields a more benign hypothesis for independent regulatory agencies.
The current paper also abstracts from any collusion possibilities of regulators. This allows it to show that already without collusion the trade-offs concerning political independence is nontrivial and economically relevant. It therefore differs from, for example, Faure-Grimaud and
Martimort (2007), who explicitly focus on collusion and identify a positive stabilization effect of independent regulators when these regulators are more prone to collusion than independent ones.
Finally, the current paper is related to Strausz (2011) , who develops a model of regulatory risk of which a variant is used here. An important difference is however that Strausz (2011) takes the degree of regulatory risk as exogenous and takes its source for granted. It moreover analyzes the impact of the fluctuation and expansion effect on the regulated firm, the consumer, and the regulator rather than some political party. In contrasts the current paper focuses on a particular source of regulatory risk -politically induced regulatory risk -and investigates the incentive of the responsible economic agents -political parties -to control this risk. It thereby endogenizes the degree of regulatory risk.
The Setup
A privately informed monopolistic firm produces a publicly provided good x at constant marginal costs c with no fixed costs. Hence, the firm's profit from producing a quantity x for a lump-sum transfer t is
Marginal costs are c l with probability ν and c h with probability 1 − ν, where ∆c ≡ c h − c l > 0.
Only the firm learns the realization of its marginal costs c. Its outside option is zero.
Consumers pay a lump-sum transfer t in exchange for the consumption of a quantity x, and obtain a consumer surplus of
The term v(x) expresses the consumers' overall utility from the consumption of a quantity x of the good. It is increasing at a decreasing rate, i.e., v ′ > 0 and v ′′ < 0, and its third order derivative, v ′′′ , determines the local curvature of the consumers' aggregate demand function.
3
Before regulation takes place, there is a general election between a party l and a party r.
The election determines the ruling party that runs the government and, ultimately, decides about the regulation. Importantly, the election outcome is uncertain. 4 It is instructive to first take the level of electoral uncertainty as exogenous: party l wins the election with probability π ∈ (0, 1) and party r wins it with probability 1 − π. Section 7 endogenizes the degree of electoral uncertainty by introducing electoral competition.
Both parties are benevolent in that they maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus and profits. In line with the economic literature on partisan politics 5 , the parties attach different weights to profits. These differences express the extent to which the two parties differ in their perception of the appropriate weight α in society's social choice function and the extent to which they cater to the preferences of heterogeneous voter groups. In particular, party p's objective function is
where the parameter α p ∈ [0, 1) represents the weight of party p on profits. Party r has a more business friendly orientation so that α r > α l . In summary, a firm that receives a transfer t and produces a quantity x at marginal costs c i yields party p ∈ {l, r} a payoff of
The triple (π, α l , α r ) describes the political system. For a given political system, let ∆α ≡ α r − α l > 0 represent the political divergence of the system.
Following Baron (1988) , the government delegates the regulatory task to a regulatory agency by endowing the agency with a specific objective function:
Hence, the government's decision is the weight α a with which the agency is to regulate.
3 The consumer's demand x(p) solves max x v(x)−px and satisfies the first order condition v ′ (x(p)) = p. By the implicit function theorem, differentiating twice and rearranging terms yields
Due to v ′′ < 0, the sign of v ′′′ fully determines the curvature of demand. 4 Moe (1990, p228 , footnote 16) notes "political uncertainty is absolutely fundamental to the public sector". 5 E.g., Baron (1988) , Boyer and Laffont (1999) , Laffont (2000) , Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003) and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2007) The paper concentrates on the following political game Γ: t = 0 : Parties may agree on institutionalizing an agency with a weight α a ∈ [0, 1] on profits. t = 1 : Nature determines the election winner p ∈ {l, r}. t = 2 : Without agreement in t = 0, the election winner chooses the agency's weight α a . t = 3 : The agency offers the firm a regulatory schedule. Consequently, the only task of the agency is to propose a regulatory schedule to the firm.
In particular, the agency does not engage in information acquisition or any other productive task. This limited role of the agency makes explicit that the incentives of the political parties whether to grant political independence is driven entirely by considerations of regulatory risk rather than other concerns such as information acquisition or collusion.
Given a specific weight α a , the agency offers a regulatory schedule that is optimal given its objective function W a . By the revelation principle, the optimal regulation contract is a direct mechanism (t l , x l , t h , x h ) that maximizes the regulator's objective under the firm's participation and incentive constraints:
Standard arguments imply that the incentive compatibility of the efficient firm c l and the individual rationality constraint of the inefficient firm c h are binding. Consequently, given a
Using these expressions to substitute out the binding constraints leads to the following first order conditions that characterize the optimal quantity schedules (x l ,x h ):
where ψ ≡ ν/(1 − ν). Hence, the usual result obtains that the allocation of the efficient type coincides with the first best and the allocation of the inefficient type is distorted downwards.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) reveals how outputx h depends on α a :
The first expression is, due to v ′′ < 0, positive and, therefore,
h . The more business friendly party r asks the firm to produce more, because it discounts less the information rent that is required with higher production. The second expression reiterates one of the main findings in Strausz (2011) that the curvature of demand, v ′′′ , determines the curvature ofx h with respect to α a .
Politically Induced Regulatory Risk
Consider as a benchmark the political game Γ without the pre-electoral bargaining stage t = 0 so that in stage t = 2 the winning party simply chooses the agency's weight α a . Because a weight α a leads to a production x l =x l in case of an efficient firm and x h =x h (α a ) in case of an inefficient firm, the choice α a in t = 2 yields party p the expected payof
The following lemma confirms the intuitive but helpful property thatŴ p is single-peaked and attains a maximum at α p .
Lemma 1
The functionŴ p is increasing for α < α p and decreasing for α > α p . It attains a unique maximum at α p so thatŴ
. From the lemma, it then follows that it is best for a ruling party p to endow the agency with its own weight α p . This means that production fluctuates with the election outcome, because if party l wins, the inefficient firm ends up producing x h (α l ), while it produces x h (α r ) when party r wins. In the presence of uncertain election outcomes, this leads to politically induced regulatory risk.
Proposition 1 Without pre-electoral bargaining, regulatory risk results and a party p obtains the pre-electoral expected payoff of
The rest of the paper investigates the attitudes of the political parties towards this risk and their incentives to negotiate it away in period t = 0.
Risk Attitudes
This section investigates the party's risk attitude towards politically induced regulatory risk by following the idea that the risky election outcome -weight α l with probability π and α r with probability (1 − π) -is, in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) , a mean preserving spread of the deterministic expected weight
Hence, in line with classical risk analysis, a political party dislikes regulatory risk when its expected payoff with the risk is smaller than its payoff from regulating with the expected but deterministic weight α e :Ŵ
If the inequality is reversed, a party, in contrast, likes regulatory risk. Hence, the curvature of W p determines party p's attitude towards risk. In particular, party p dislikes regulatory risk, when its payoffŴ p is concave in α, whereas it likes the risk if its payoff is convex. The following lemma establishes a sufficient condition under which a party's payoffŴ p is locally concave.
Lemma 2 The functionŴ p (α) is concave in the neighborhood of α when
When the local condition (8) holds globally, the functionŴ p (α) is concave globally, which implies that party p dislikes regulatory risk in general. Because the expected policy preference α e lies in between α l and α r , the relevant interval for considering the curvature ofŴ p (α) is
, all the signs of the different terms in (8) are unambiguously determined except for v ′′′ , which represents the curvature of demand.
The following proposition states the extent to which risk attitudes depend on this curvature.
Proposition 2 For linear demand (v ′′′ = 0), both parties dislike regulatory risk. When demand is globally convex (v ′′′ > 0), party l dislikes regulatory risk. When demand is globally concave (v ′′′ < 0), party r dislikes regulatory risk.
In order to understand the intuition behind Proposition 2, it is helpful to decompose the overall effect of regulatory risk in an expansion effect and a fluctuation effect.
First recall the result at the end of Section 3 that the curvature of demand, v ′′′ , determines the curvature ofx h with respect to α a . In particular, the outputx h is convex in α a when the consumer's demand is convex and vice versa. Hence, if one compares the allocationx at the expected weight α e to the expected output under regulatory risk
Figure 1: Payoff effects of regulatory risk then, under convex demand,x e h ≥x(α e ). This means that regulatory risk has a positive expansion effect on output when demand is convex. For concave demand, it followsx e h ≤x(α e ) so that the expansion effect of regulatory risk is negative. For linear demand,x e h andx(α e ) coincide; regulatory risk has no expansion effect.
To understand the fluctuation effect of regulatory risk, consider first the case of linear demand where there is no expansion effect:x e h =x h (α e ). In this case, regulatory risk has only a fluctuation effect in that, with regulatory risk, output fluctuates betweenx h (α l ) andx h (α r ), whereas without regulatory risk it is fixed at its expected valuex h (α e ) = x e h . Because of the consumers' decreasing marginal utility, the two parties dislike such fluctuations. This explains the statement of Proposition 2 that, with linear demand, both parties dislike regulatory risk. Now if demand is convex, then the expansion effect is positive so that regulatory risk raises the expected value of the output itself. From the perspective of party l, regulatory risk therefore moves the expected allocationx e h further from its ideal outputx h (α l ) so that the expansion effect hurts party l. Given that also the fluctuation effect is negative, the two effects reinforce each other and, therefore, party l unambiguously dislikes regulatory risk. This explains the second statement of Proposition 2 that, with convex demand, party l dislikes regulatory risk.
In contrast, a positive expansion effect has a positive effect on party r, because it moves the expected outputx e h closer to its ideal valuex h (α r ). Hence, from party r's perspective, a positive output expansion effect counteracts the fluctuation effect. If the former is strong enough, party r actually likes regulatory risk. The opposite logic holds when the expansion effect is negative so that output contracts. Proposition 2 gives a definite answer about risk preferences for demand functions that are either globally convex or globally concave. It is, however, uninformative about risk preferences for demand curves with a changing curvature. For such demand functions, the local effect of regulatory risk can change over the relevant domain [α l , α r ] and one has to consider the overall global effect of regulatory risk directly. The following proposition extends the previous one in that it shows that, independent of the demand curve, at least one political party dislikes regulatory risk.
Proposition 3 In any political system (π, α l , α r ), at least one political party dislikes regulatory risk. If the expansion effect is positive (x e h ≥x h (α e )), then party l dislikes regulatory risk. If the expansion effect is negative (x e h ≤x h (α e )), then party r dislikes regulatory risk. In the light of the intuition behind Proposition 2, the reasoning behind Proposition 3 is straightforward. As argued, the fluctuation effect impacts the political parties negatively. A positive expansion effect, therefore, reinforces party l's dislike of the fluctuation effect so that this party dislikes regulatory risk. Similarly, a negative expansion effect reinforces the negative impact of the fluctuation effect of party r. Because, the expansion effect is either positive, negative, or zero, there is at least one party for whom the negative impact of the fluctuation effect is (weakly) reinforced by the expansion effect. As a consequence, at least one political party dislikes regulatory risk.
Proposition 3 reveals that at least one party dislikes regulatory risk, but Figure 1 illustrates that the other party may or may not like it. Using Lemma 2 one may characterize political systems in which both parties dislike regulatory risk. Defining a political system as risk averse when both parties dislike regulatory risk and by defining
the following comparative static results obtain.
Proposition 4 A political system (π, α l , α r ) is averse to regulatory risk whenever
i) political divergence ∆α is small and, in particular, smaller thanv/(ψ∆c);
ii) the winning probability of the regulatory risk averse party is small enough;
iii) the difference in costs ∆c is small and, in particular, smaller thanv/(ψ∆α); iv) the probability of an efficient firm, ν, is small and, in particular, smaller thanv/(v + ∆α∆c).
To understand the first result of the proposition, note that, because the curveŴ p (α) reaches its maximum at α p , it is strictly concave around α p . By continuity it then follows that, a party's objective functionŴ p (α) is concave for weights α close to the party's ideal weight α p . The first result, therefore, follows from the observation that a party's payoff must be concave over the whole range [α l , α r ] when this range is small.
The second result shows that a sufficient condition for a political system to be averse to regulatory risk is that the party which may potentially like regulatory risk is likely enough to win. At first sight this seems surprising, but the result follows again from the observation that the curveŴ p is necessarily concave around α p . When party p has a high enough probability of winning then this implies that the expected α e lies close to α p and the curveŴ p is, therefore, also concave in the neighborhood of α e . This explains that, irrespective of the expansion effect, a party necessarily dislikes regulatory risk, when its probability of winning is high enough.
The economic intuition behind the last two results of Proposition 4 follows from considering the fundamentals of the regulation problem. When ∆c or ν become small, the private information problem disappears and information rents become irrelevant. Because the parties differ only in the way they evaluate these information rents, these differences disappear when the private information problem becomes negligible.
Political Bargaining and Independent Regulators
When the political system is averse to regulatory risk, parties benefit from fully eliminating it by institutionalizing a politically independent agency that attaches the weight α e to profits.
Hence, for such systems, one may expect regulatory risk not to occur.
For political systems that are not averse to regulatory risk, at least one party loses from institutionalizing an agency with the weight α e . In this case, the parties may try to reach a mutual beneficial agreement on another weight α a , meaning that with the possibility of preelectoral agreements an exclusive focus on the average weight α e is too limited. Moreover, rather than bargaining over a single weight α a , parties can expand negotiations to pairs of 
with at least one strict inequality. Figure 2 illustrates that Pareto optimal agreements can be characterized by using the standard techniques of indifference curves in consumer theory. Because of the differences in the slopes of the indifference curves that go through a point off the 45-degree line, agreements which do not eliminate all regulatory risk are not Pareto optimal. To make this observation precise, consider the marginal rate of substitution
from which follows that
Because the marginal rate of substitution expresses the slope of the indifference curve, an indifference curve I r associated with a point above the 45-degree line, where α l < α r , is steeper than its corresponding indifference curve I l . Hence, agreements that exhibit α l < α r are not Pareto optimal, since moving towards the 45-degree yields a Pareto improvement. Similarly for pairs below the 45-degree line where α r < α l , the indifference I l is steeper than I r so that again moving closer to the 45-degree line yields a Pareto improvement. Pareto optimal pairs are only found on the 45-degree line, where the marginal rates of substitution coincide. The following lemma summarizes the result.
Proposition 5 Pareto optimal pre-electoral agreements (α l a , α r a ) exhibit α l a = α r a , implying that in any political system, the efficient pre-electoral agreements fully eliminate politically induced regulatory risk by institutionalizing an independent regulatory agency with a unconditional weight α a .
According to the proposition, Pareto optimal agreements can be characterized by a single unconditional α a ∈ [0, 1]. Recalling expressions (5) and (6) allows a characterization of agreements that are also mutually beneficial to the parties. In particular, a politically independent agency with weight α a yields party p at least its expected status quo payoff exactly when
Hence, let α * p ∈ [α l , α r ] satisfy the relation
Because W e p lies in betweenŴ p (α l ) andŴ p (α r ) andŴ p is continuous and monotone on the interval [α l , α r ], the value α * p exists and is unique. Moreover, party l strictly prefers a politically independent agency with a weight α a < α * l to the risky default option, becauseŴ l is decreasing on [α l , α r ]. Similarly, party r strictly prefers a politically independent agency with a weight α a > α * r to the risky default option. Proposition 5 implies that α * r ≤ α * l so that both parties prefer an independent regulator operating with a weight α a for any α a ∈ (α * r , α * l ). This reasoning leads to the following result.
Proposition 6 In a political system (π, α l , α r ), both parties benefit from institutionalizing a politically independent agencies with weight
Aligned risk attitudes: Figure 3 illustrates the construction of the proposition's set A * . The first graph illustrates its construction in the case where both parties dislike regulatory risk, whereas the second graph illustrates the case where one party actually likes regulatory risk. As illustrated, only in the former case it holds α e ∈ A * .
Endogenous Election Probabilities
Investigating political uncertainty as the driver behind regulatory risk, the previous sections A median voter model is used as a micro foundation for uncertain elections. 7 In particular, consider voters whose preferences differ only in one dimension: the weight α attached to profits.
The voters' preferences concerning α are distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F (α|s), where s describes the state of the world. When posting their platforms, the political parties do not know the state s and are therefore ignorant of the exact distribution 7 An alternative micro foundation for random election outcomes would be an electoral setup with costly voting. E.g., Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) show that, for intermediate voting costs, the political economy model exhibits a mixed equilibrium, where each individual randomizes concerning his decision whether to vote.
Because of its low analytical tractability of the mixed equilibrium, the current paper takes a different approach.
of voters. To model this uncertainty explicitly, let G(s) describe the cumulative probability distribution of s.
The timing of the political game with endogenous elections, Γ e , is as follows: In this one-dimensional voting model, the median voter theorem holds so that the median voter determines the election outcome. The median voter rationally votes for the platform closest to his own preferences. When the platforms are the same, he randomizes with probability 1/2. Because the political parties do not know the exact distribution of voters, they also do not know the exact preferences of the median voter α m . Indeed, given platforms (α l , α r ) the probability that party l wins is
Consequently, the expected payoff of party p ∈ {l, h} is
Given these payoff functions, the political parties simultaneously choose their platforms at stage t = 1. The pair (α l ,α r ) forms a Nash equilibrium ifα l is a best reply toα r and vice versa.
From the primitives G(s) and F (α|s) the cumulative probability distribution G m (α m ) obtains, representing the probability that the median voter's preferences do not exceed α m . Given the parties' platforms (α l , α r ), the probability that party l wins is
Under the assumption that the density g m of G m is continuous with support [0, 1], it follows π(α l , α r ) ∈ (0, 1) for all α l , α r ∈ (0, 1) and the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Any Nash equilibrium (α l ,α r ) exhibits α l <α l <α r < α r .
The lemma shows that, due to the uncertainty about the preferences of the median voter, the parties do not offer identical platforms. Hence, also the framework with political competition induces regulatory risk. The competition, however, reduces regulatory risk to some degree, characterize the Nash equilibrium (α l ,α r ).
Because regulatory risk persists in the presence of political competition, the question whether the political parties have an incentive to reduce it through political bargaining remains relevant also with political competition. Extending the political game Γ e by an initial stage t = 0, where parties can agree on installing some (partially) independent regulator with objectives (α A first observation is that with respect to politically independent regulatory agencies all previous results remain valid. To see this, suppose political agreement about a politically independent regulatory agency α a changes the party l's winning probability from π(α l , α r ) to some π ′ . In this case, party p is better off from agreeing to α a than entering the political game Γ e exactly if α a satisfies
For the specific case α a = α e this inequality is identical to (7). It therefore follows that the results of Section 5 concerning the risk attitudes towards regulatory risk extend to situations where this risk is due to political competition rather than exogenous uncertainty. The reason is that, although endogenous election outcomes generate the additional effect that winning probabilities are no longer constant, this effect is irrelevant because by institutionalizing a politically independent regulatory agency the parties are actually indifferent about who wins the election.
The final step is to argue that also the results of Section 6 are robust to considering endogenous election outcomes. Here the main result was that, independent of the political system, Pareto optimal pre-electoral bargaining outcomes necessarily eliminate all regulatory risk. As argued, this depends on the marginal rates of substitution. Using (10) it follows 
An Illustration: The US Postal System
Using as a concrete example the US Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), I illustrate the extent to which this paper's theoretical insights help to understand how regulatory agencies are shaped in practise. Formerly called the Postal Rate Commission, the main task of the PRC is to regulate the rates of the United States Postal Service (USPS), which has a governmentenforced monopoly on the delivery of first-class mail.
The PRC was created by the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 and was instrumental in resolving the postal strike of 1970 that crippled the country to such an extent that President Nixon had to declare a state of emergency and call in both the armed forces and the National Guard to reinstate postal services.
8 The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 abolished the then United States Post Office Department, which, at the time, was one of the largest employers in the world.
9
Chaifetz (1971) explains that the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 was a direct response to the smothering, close political control of both the US presidential cabinet and the US Congress.
Already the Kappel Report (1968) , which formed the basis of the Act, attributed the failure of the US Postal system mainly to the excessive political control. This control not only led to a low working moral which culminated in the postal strike, but also expressed itself in politically induced regulatory risk.
Before the Act, the head of the Postal Department, the Postmaster General, was a direct member of the President's cabinet and was appointed solely on the basis of political affiliation.
A change of political control typically led to a replacement of the Postmaster General. 10 This change in control closely reflects the politically induced regulatory risk as modelled in this paper, because whenever a presidential election led to a president with a different political affiliation, the Postmaster General changed and, thereby, the objectives of the organization.
Moreover, the postal rate was directly set by the US Congress through the Senate Committee political favoritism and bribery.
With the explicit goal of minimizing political control, the Act transformed the Post Office from an executive department under direct political control to an independent establishment of the executive branch.
13 Consistent with the arguments in this paper, the main tool for safeguarding postal regulation from political influence was institutional: the creation of the Postal Rate Commission as a politically-independent agency to which the US Congress delegated its power to regulate postal rates.
Moreover, the Act followed after intense political bargaining between all political parties involved as President Nixon himself stresses in his remarks on signing the Act: "We could not have this measure had it not been for the bipartisan support, Democrats and Republicans, working together for this reform legislation." 14 In line with the arguments in this paper, this political bargaining explicitly involved the objective of the Postal system. Against the advice of the Kappel Report (1968) to run the Post Office as a for-profit organization, it was agreed upon that the Post Office continues its operation as a public service. 15 In order to ensure a politically balanced governance, the Act also explicitly specifies that of the PRC's five members no more than three may be of one political party. 
Conclusion
The analysis shows that, while political parties, in general, have conflicting attitudes towards regulatory risk, they have a common interest in fully eliminating it. Consequently, the incentives of the political system are in line with the concerns of practitioners to reduce uncertainty as mentioned in the introduction. This also means that political parties have no interest in exacerbating regulatory risk artificially. I conclude this section discussing possible limitations, extensions, and applications of the results.
13 See Chaifetz (1971) 
Commitment and Delegation
The analysis followed the literature on delegation in its assumption that political parties can implement pre-electoral agreements by delegating the regulatory task to independent regulators and commit not to replace them after the election. Even though the micro foundation underlying "commitment-by-delegation" is unclear, it has strong empirical and intuitive appeal.
16
In the specific context of regulation, appropriate institutional arrangements strengthens commitment by delegation. 17 This is for example illustrated in the discussion of "regulatory holidays" in the European fibre optic markets. teractions circumvent commitment problems in a political economy. His framework is especially well suited to study commitment in the regulatory context of this paper, because it studies a 16 Moe (1990, p245) notes that "the fact is that new governments do not take office and begin demolishing the existing bureaucracy. The vast bulk of government seems pretty safe from this sort of thing." Yet, the empirical analysis of Gilardi (2002 Gilardi ( , 2005 reveals that this delegation is often far from perfect. 17 In the explicit context of regulation see also Spulber and Besanko (1992) model in which the parties' payoff functions are single peaked and concave with respect to a one-dimensional policy variable.
Political Bargaining
The formal analysis characterizes Pareto optimal pre-electoral agreements and shows that they imply a complete elimination of regulatory risk. Under efficient bargaining political parties will reach an efficient agreement and, hence, agree to institutionalize an independent regulatory agency. The set of mutually beneficial agreements is generally however not a singleton. This raises the question on which of these agreements the political parties agree. This question is nontrivial, because within the set of mutually beneficial agreements A * , the two political parties have diverging preferences. For instance, party l prefers values close to α * r whereas party r prefers values close to α * l . It then depends on the relative bargaining strengths and the specific bargaining procedure which kind of politically independent agency α a ∈ A * the parties will institutionalize.
When bargaining is inefficient, political parties will only reach an agreement if the benefits from the agreement outweigh the bargaining costs. Especially when empirically testing the theoretical implications of the model, it is important to point out that bargaining costs limit the applicability of some of the results. In particular, when there is little political divergence, the gains from pre-electoral agreements is small so that negotiations may not outweigh bargaining costs. The discussion of the regulatory overhaul of the US Postal System in Section 8 however indicates that, in practise, political parties do manage to reach such agreements when the potential gains are high.
Because monetary side payments seem inappropriate in a political economy context, the analysis concentrated on a setup where political parties are unable to use direct side payments to facilitate bargaining. If one allows such side payments then efficient bargaining leads to a regulation on the basis of a regulatory variable α * lr that maximizes the common surpluŝ W lr (α) ≡Ŵ l (α) +Ŵ h (α). It is straightforward to see that the common surplus function is equivalent to twice the surplus functionŴ p (α) that obtains from an individual party p with the weight α p = (α l + α r )/2. It is then immediate that α * lr = (α l + α r )/2. The possibility of side payments, therefore, strengthens the positive result that political parties have an incentive to eliminate the regulatory risk, because it follows, by Lemma 1, that the common surplus function has a unique maximum.
For the special case where demand is concave (v ′′′ < 0), it follows, for any α ∈ (α l , α r ), that (α r − α)ψ∆cv ′′′ (x) < 0 < (v ′′ (x)) 2 . Hence, inequality (8) is satisfied so thatŴ r (α) is concave and, therefore,W e r is smaller thanŴ r ((1 − π)α r + πα l ) for any π ∈ (0, 1). Linear demand case (v ′′′ = 0) impliesx e h =x h (α e ). I showed that, for this case, both party r and party l dislike regulatory risk.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: I first prove the second part of the Proposition. It follows W e r −Ŵ r (α e ) = (1 − π)Ŵ r (α r ) + πŴ r (α l ) −Ŵ r (α e ) = (1 − π)W r (x l ,x h (α r )) + πW r (x l ,x h (α l )) −W r (x l ,x h (α e )) = (1 − π)W r (x l ,x h (α r )) + πW r (x l ,x h (α l )) −W r (x l ,x Due to v ′′ < 0, the first term in squared brackets is negative. The second term in square brackets is non-positive, becausex e h ≤ x h (α e ) <x h (α r ) and ∂W r /∂x h > 0 for x h < x h (α r ) implyW r (x l ,x e h ) ≤W r (x l ,x h (α e ). As a result the overall expression is negative and, therefore, party r dislikes regulatory risk.
Similarly for party l, it follows Due to v ′′ < 0, the first term in squared brackets is negative. The second term in square brackets is non-positive, becausex e h ≥ x h (α e ) >x h (α l ) and ∂W l /∂x h < 0 for x h < x h (α l ) implyW l (x l ,x e h ) ≤W l (x l ,x h (α e ). As a result the overall expression is negative and, therefore, party l dislikes regulatory risk.
Hence, if party l likes regulatory risk then, necessarily,x e h <x h (α e ), but party r then dislikes regulatory risk. Similarly, if party r likes regulatory risk thenx e h >x h (α e ), but party l then dislikes regulatory risk. Hence, if some party likes risk then the other party dislikes it. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: From (8) it follows thatŴ p (α) is concave for the range [α l , α r ] whenever |α p − α|ψ∆c < [v ′′ (x h (α))] 2 /|v ′′′ (x h (α))|. Because for this range |α p − α| < ∆α, (9) implies that a sufficient condition for the concavity over this range is ∆αψ∆c <v. Comparative static results i), iii) , iv) then follow directly from this condition.
In order to demonstrate ii), first suppose party l is a regulatory risk averse party. Because If party l is not a regulatory risk averse party, then, by Proposition 3, party r is regulatory risk averse. By a similar argument, one can then show that dŴ l (α e (0))/dπ = 0. Because W e l (π) is strictly increasing in (1 − π), it then follows thatŴ l (α e (π)) > W e l (π) for (1 − π) > 0 but close enough to 0.
